Criticism of the broker’s traditional reward model

Given the clear paradox between real-world resilience and the academic / political critique of current realtor compensation models, a recent review of the literature on this subject is a relative benefit of the current split fee model. Provides a framework for analyzing. , And insights on how it will evolve in the future.
In his 2007 article, “Is the Real Estate Agent Compensation Model Outdated?” Authors Miceli, Pancak, and Sirmans (2007) consider their relationships with modern legal bodies  my4walls and the availability of technology-driven information. Claims that the traditional percentage-based split fee model for brokers is obsolete. As a result, they conclude that during the two main phases of real estate transactions, compliance and negotiation, buyers and sellers experience significant transaction inefficiencies. It then mathematically models the existing compensation model and identifies changes that may reduce the inefficiencies it describes. Finally, Miceli et al. (2007), we propose a list of policy actions that, if implemented, can facilitate the emergence of the reward models they propose. This document draws some useful conclusions regarding policy measures. However, some of the assumptions that underpin the debate may ignore certain functional roles in the securities industry. In addition, the proposed reward model, while elegant, does not support the basic foundation on which intermediary services have traditionally been offered in large numbers. Miteceli et al. (2007) helps realtors develop a vision of how compensation develops. Main assumptions Micelietal. (2007) Their central argument is to simplify intermediary services into two comprehensive functions: agreement and negotiation. As a result, Miceli etc. (2007) Developing an economic model of rewards for brokers has economic value, but many of the functions performed by brokers that previously lacked independent pricing due to existing package service models. Exclude.
As explained above, agents provide a variety of services not only after the coordination and negotiation phases, but also within these phases. (2007) Model broker rewards. Pre-listing activity decisions, such as real estate payback levels (requiring monetary investment) and housing decisions, are often important in the corresponding phase and can have a significant impact on the final selling price. There is sex. Alternatively, the decision to choose an appraiser can affect the valuation of the property and the chances of a successful negotiation phase. In Miceli etc. (2007) Miceli et al. Since then, we believe that these types of services are of intrinsic economic value. (2007) advocates a collective list-aggregation model rather than the process by which brokers look for offers. Not for sale … “Miceli et al. (2007). It is within this process that brokers and agents market their skills (competition) and influence selling prices in the example above. Underlying Miceli et al. The assumption in. (2007) is an analysis that all seller’s intermediary services are commodities.